Why Does Generative AI Understand Some People Better Than Others?

A Linguistic Perspective on Human–AI Communication and Changes in Language and Thinking

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Abstract. Generative artificial intelligence is becoming an everyday communication partner, yet people often experience the same AI system differently. For some users, AI seems to understand intentions, preferences, and questions almost immediately; for others, communication requires repeated clarification and reformulation. This article presents the view that the difference cannot be explained only by the technical quality of an AI model. It is also connected with the language through which a person communicates with the system. People differ in vocabulary, sentence structure, explicitness, discourse organization, cultural references, professional knowledge, and the languages they use. These differences shape what information is made available to the model and how easily the intended meaning can be reconstructed from a prompt. The article further argues that human–AI communication is not one-sided. While AI systems increasingly adapt their responses to users, users themselves may begin adapting their language to what they perceive as effective AI communication. In multilingual environments such as Uzbek–Russian–English communication, this process may be especially visible through language choice, code-switching, translation, and reformulation. From this perspective, interaction with AI may gradually influence not only how people write prompts, but also how they formulate ideas, organize explanations, search for information, and solve problems. The article therefore treats AI understanding as a dynamic linguistic relationship between a person, a machine, and the communicative context.

Keywords: *generative AI, human–AI communication, linguistic adaptation, multilingualism, code-switching, cognition, language change*

MAIN ARTICLE

Generative AI has introduced a new kind of communication experience. Two people can use the same AI system, ask similar questions, and nevertheless feel that the system understands them to very different degrees. One user may receive an answer that seems precise, relevant, and personally appropriate, while another may need to explain the same intention several times. This observation leads to a broader linguistic question: why does generative AI appear to understand some people better than others?

The central point of this article is that AI understanding should not be viewed as a fixed ability that belongs entirely to the machine. It is produced through interaction. A person's choice of words, level of detail, sentence structure, background knowledge, discourse organization, and way of expressing intentions can make some meanings easier or harder for an AI system to reconstruct. In this sense, successful communication with AI depends not only on what the user wants to say, but also on how that intention is linguistically encoded.

People naturally differ in the signals they provide. Some users formulate requests explicitly, describe the context, specify constraints, and explain what kind of response they expect. Others communicate through short, ambiguous, or highly context-dependent expressions. Neither style is necessarily better in human conversation, because people normally share background knowledge, social context, gestures, intonation, and previous experience. AI interaction, however, relies heavily on the information

available in the linguistic input and the conversational context. As a result, differences that may be unimportant in ordinary human communication can become highly visible in communication with an AI system.

Lexical choice is another important factor. Precise vocabulary can reduce ambiguity and help distinguish between several possible meanings. At the same time, specialist terminology may be useful for an expert but difficult when the surrounding context is missing. Sentence organization also matters. A logically structured request can make relationships between goals, conditions, and expected outcomes more transparent. Thus, what users experience as AI 'understanding' may partly reflect the degree to which their linguistic signals allow the system to identify the intended task.

Expertise creates another layer of difference. An expert and a non-expert may describe the same problem in completely different ways. The expert may use compressed terminology and assume shared knowledge, while the non-expert may provide longer explanations and more contextual information. AI may respond differently to these forms because the linguistic information available for interpretation is different. This does not necessarily mean that one person is understood more deeply as a human being. It may simply mean that one communicative form gives the system a clearer path to the intended meaning.

The multilingual situation makes this relationship even more interesting. In Uzbek–Russian–English communication, a person does not always express the same idea through direct translation. Different languages provide different lexical resources, grammatical structures, discourse patterns, and culturally familiar ways of expressing an intention. A multilingual user may switch languages because a particular word feels more precise, because a concept is easier to formulate in another language, or because the AI appears to respond more effectively in that language. Code-switching and reformulation therefore become meaningful parts of human–AI communication rather than accidental features of speech.

There is also a second side to the relationship. AI does not only adapt to people; people can adapt to AI. When users discover that certain ways of formulating requests produce clearer or more useful responses, they may begin to repeat those patterns. They may become more explicit, divide complex requests into steps, provide more context, define terms, or specify the desired format. What begins as a practical communication strategy can gradually become a habitual way of expressing ideas. In this sense, human–AI communication can be understood as a process of reciprocal linguistic adaptation.

This reciprocal adaptation raises an important question about language and thinking. The argument here is not that AI automatically changes human cognition. Rather, repeated communication practices can influence habitual ways of organizing information. If a person regularly asks AI to structure ideas, summarize material, generate alternatives, reformulate sentences, or identify connections, these practices may become part of the person's normal approach to planning, writing, explaining, and problem-solving. The technology can therefore become more than a tool for producing text. It can become part of the communicative environment in which thinking is expressed and organized.

From this perspective, the most interesting issue is not simply whether AI is becoming better at understanding humans. It is whether humans and AI are gradually learning to communicate with one another through shared patterns. AI models can adjust their vocabulary, tone, level of explanation, and response structure according to the user. Users, in turn, can learn how to formulate language that receives more satisfactory responses. The interaction therefore creates a feedback loop: human language influences AI output, and AI output can influence subsequent human language.

The main position of this article is that differences in AI understanding across users should be considered a linguistic and interactional phenomenon, not only a technological one. People bring different linguistic repertoires, levels of expertise, cultural references, communication habits, and multilingual resources to the same AI system. These differences influence how easily intentions can be inferred from interaction. At the same time, repeated interaction may encourage users to modify their own communicative behavior.

Generative AI may therefore understand some people better not simply because those people are 'better at AI', but because their linguistic signals, contextual information, and communication strategies make their intentions easier to interpret. Once interaction becomes regular, however, the relationship may reverse: people can also begin to communicate in ways increasingly adapted to AI. Human–AI communication should consequently be viewed as a dynamic process of mutual linguistic adaptation, with potential consequences not only for the way we write and speak, but also for the way we formulate, organize, and develop our thoughts.

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